JavaScript SDK — @authoxi/js

npm install @authoxi/js

One package, two jobs that don't overlap:

@authoxi/js — the browser SDK

import { loadAuthoxi } from '@authoxi/js';

const authoxi = await loadAuthoxi({ publishableKey: 'pk_live_…' });
authoxi.signIn({ onAuth: ({ user, tokens }) => { /* … */ } });

It is a loader, not a bundle. The package injects the SDK <script> from the asset host at runtime and hands you back the global — it does not vendor a copy of authoxi.js.

That is deliberate, and it is what Stripe (@stripe/stripe-js), Plaid and Intercom all do: for a security-sensitive auth SDK, the hosted copy has to stay the single source of truth, so a fix reaches every embedder at once and nobody is left running a stale bundled copy of your login form. The npm version and the hosted version are decoupled on purpose — this loader changes only when the init surface changes.

loadAuthoxi(init?, options?)

Injects the script (once — concurrent calls share one promise) and resolves to the initialised instance, or to the raw global if you pass no init.

Returns AuthoxiInstance with signIn() / signUp(). Rejects if called server-side (there is no window), so it fails loudly in SSR instead of hanging.

@authoxi/js/verify — prove a human approved it

Verify that a specific human approved a specific agent action — and that nobody has touched the record since. The public key is carried inside the event's own did:key, so this needs nothing but the event you hand it. It works if authoxi is offline, acquired, or dead. That is the point: an audit record that needs the vendor alive to validate is not an audit record, it is a receipt.

import { verifyEvent, verifyStream } from '@authoxi/js/verify';

const { ok, verified, checks } = await verifyEvent(event);
// ok       — every signature present on the event holds; nothing was altered
// verified — a human's signature is present AND valid (derived, never read off the flag)

const stream = await verifyStream(events);   // signatures AND seq continuity — catches deletion

It is isomorphic — the same module runs in a browser on WebCrypto with no server round-trip, which is exactly what the live verifier page does. Nothing is uploaded; the check happens on the reader's machine, which is the only kind of check worth anything.

From a terminal, or in CI

npx -p @authoxi/js authoxi-verify decision.json

PASS  evt_01JZQK8F3M4N5P6Q7R8S9T0V1W  approve payment 9000.00 USD
      ✓ emitter signature: valid — signed by did:key:z6MkrEET…
      ✓ approver signature: valid — a human signed this: did:key:z6MkehRg…

Exit code 0 if every signature holds, 1 if any doesn't — so it drops straight into a pipeline and fails the build on a broken audit trail:

- run: npx -p @authoxi/js authoxi-verify audit/decisions.jsonl   # also checks seq for holes

Installed globally (npm i -g @authoxi/js), it is just authoxi-verify decision.json.

Three implementations, sharing no code

They are deliberately independent, and the CLI does not call the library. Three programs that share no code, all agreeing on one known-answer vector produced by the real signer, is evidence the wire format is real — rather than something that is true only because one program says so. Every attack vector runs against all three, and the build fails if any of them drifts.

You are encouraged to write a fourth. If it disagrees with ours, one of us has a bug, and we would like to know which.